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Introduction
Although neither the Federal Reserve System
nor the U.S. Treasury has intervened in foreign
exchange markets since August 1995, the pol-
icy has not been officially abdicated by the
United States, Germany, or Japan.1 Several
Southeast Asian central banks have conducted
interventions recently in an attempt to main-
tain exchange-rate pegs and counter the vola-
tility associated with capital flows. This implies
a belief that intervention can alter either the
level or the volatility of exchange rates.2
A large body of research, however, questions
intervention’s usefulness, generally finding that
the policy has consequences that seem to vary
with the period being studied, effects that are
inconsistent with the theoretical mechanisms
through which intervention might operate, and
ultimately, little impact. Such findings must be
evaluated in light of the general failure of eco-
nomic theories of exchange-rate movements
when it comes to explaining actual rates. Un-
fortunately, most central banks provide little
day-to-day information about intervention ac-
tions, making it difficult to test hypotheses
about intervention’s effectiveness. This lack of
data supports speculation that intervention
might explain some of the anomalies in interna-
tional finance.
Recent research has provided insight into
one such anomaly—the forward discount puz-
zle. This refers to the finding that the currencies
of countries with high interest rates appreciate
in value, instead of declining, as uncovered in-
terest parity (UIP) might imply. The relevance
of the relationship between interest-rate differ-
entials and movements in currency values is
obvious from even a casual perusal of the fi-
nancial press’ analyses of currency market de-
velopments. These stories usually explain cur-
rency appreciations in terms of unexpected
economic strength, which would imply higher
short-term interest rates. One might be tempted
to conclude that the financial press accepts the
n 1 By law, the Treasury could intervene alone. Typically, however, the
Treasury and the Federal Reserve act together and with equal authority. All
official exchange-market transactions are conducted by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, which maintains one account for the Treasury and one for
the Federal Reserve (see Humpage [1994] for further discussion).
n 2 It is not clear at this time whether the 1997 intervention opera-
tions conducted by Southeast Asian central banks were sterilized so as to
have no direct impact on monetary aggregates. Unsterilized intervention is
not distinct from monetary policy.
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anomaly as fact.3  The forward discount puzzle
can also be described as the finding that the
forward rate on foreign exchange predicts the
wrong direction of movement for the spot
exchange rate. The myriad studies that have
focused on this puzzle have been dominated
by issues of statistical inference, although a few
papers have demonstrated a role for exchange-
rate policies.
In this article, I utilize official data on U.S.
and German central bank interventions to ex-
amine the connection between these actions
and the forward discount puzzle for the Ger-
man mark/U.S. dollar (DM/$) and Japanese
yen/U.S. dollar (Yen/$) exchange rates from
1985 to 1991. This work is motivated partly by
the findings of Flood and Rose (1996; hence-
forth FR) that countries with higher interest
rates are more likely to have their currencies
appreciate (the forward discount puzzle) if their
exchange rate is floating rather than fixed.
Another motivation comes from evidence, pre-
sented in Baillie and Osterberg (1997), that is
consistent with intervention affecting a risk pre-
mium in the forward market. Because interven-
tions are often motivated by a desire to influ-
ence the level (or volatility) of the exchange
rate, by some measures they could be related
to the distinction between fixed and floating
exchange-rate regimes.4  I thus estimate regres-
sions of exchange-rate changes on interest-rate
differentials for the full sample period and for
subperiods when intervention was relatively
heavy or when policymakers expressed will-
ingness to intervene. At least for the DM/$, the
forward discount puzzle is stronger during the
interventionist subperiods. This appears to
strengthen FR’s finding that policy is an impor-
tant determinant of exchange rates’ response to
interest-rate differentials.
This article is organized as follows: Section I
reviews the relevant portion of the literature
analyzing the impact of central bank interven-
tion. Section II summarizes recent studies of 
the forward discount puzzle, including some
papers that suggest a role for intervention. Sec-
tion III discusses the data and the simple ana-
lytical framework used here to discover if inter-
vention might explain a portion of the puzzle.
Section IV presents the results, and section V
states the conclusions.
I. Evidence on the
Impact of Central
Bank Intervention
Thorough summaries of evidence on the im-
pact of central bank intervention are provided
by Edison (1993) and Almekinders (1995). Typ-
ically, U.S. intervention operations are sterilized
by an offsetting transaction with government
securities that leaves the monetary aggregates
unaffected. Because nonsterilized intervention
can be considered a form of monetary policy,
most research has focused on sterilized inter-
vention, which is usually thought to operate
either through a portfolio balance channel or
by giving the marketplace signals of future gov-
ernment policies. In the former case, the mag-
nitude of an intervention’s impact is predicted
to depend on the size of the intervention rela-
tive to the portfolios of investors choosing
between government debt denominated in dif-
ferent currencies.5  Given the immensity of cur-
rency holdings, it is perhaps not surprising that
researchers have usually found no significant
portfolio balance effect. The signaling channel
would be operative if the intervening authori-
ties had information not already available to the
market. Such information might take the form
of economic data, which, if public, would sug-
gest a higher market value for the currency. The
information could also take the form of policy
intentions to boost the value of the currency.
Generally, evidence regarding the portfolio
balance channel has been negative. Although
some impact is found, the coefficients’ signs are
often inconsistent with the theory, one implica-
tion of which is that purchases of domestic cur-
rency—and the offsetting sales of domestic
government securities—could induce investors
to hold relatively more domestic securities only
if the domestic currency increased in value.
However, the empirical performance of models
of the risk premium in foreign exchange rates
has generally been unsatisfactory.
n 3 On the other hand, as can be inferred from equation (1), UIP
directly implies that interest differentials correspond only to expected
exchange-rate movements, not to actual movements. Thus, an apparently
anomalous increase in the currency value might itself be associated with
an expected depreciation that is greater than before. 
n 4 However, it is unclear what measure of intervention is relevant in
this context. Obvious candidates include the frequency of intervention and
its magnitude.
n 5 The portfolio balance theory rests on two key assumptions: first,
that investors view bonds of different currency denominations as imperfect
substitutes, and second, that Ricardian equivalence does not hold. 
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Research on the signaling channel has had
little more success in explaining the comove-
ments of intervention, monetary aggregates,
interest rates, and exchange rates. This likewise
might not seem surprising, considering the fail-
ure of monetary models of exchange-rate deter-
mination. After all, if monetary policy has little
predictive power for exchange rates, why
should we expect intervention’s impact on
exchange rates to be consistent with the future
monetary decisions that intervention implies?
The signaling mechanism does not make sense
unless the impact of intervention on exchange
rates (for example, U.S. authorities buying Ger-
man marks with U.S. dollars, thus increasing
DM/$) is generally consistent with subsequent
monetary policy (such as decreased U.S. inter-
est rates). Klein and Rosengren (1991) find no
predictable relationship between intervention
and monetary policy, and Kaminsky and Lewis
(1996) report that intervention’s impact on
exchange rates is sometimes inconsistent with




The forward discount puzzle can be understood
by considering two separate relations. Equation
(1) states UIP that equates the expected gross
return at time t from investing one U.S. dollar
for a period of length k at rate rt,k with the
expected gross return from converting the dollar
to a foreign currency (at rate st, which denotes
foreign currency units per dollar), investing the
proceeds at the foreign rate rt,k *, and convert-
ing back to U.S. dollars at the future exchange
rate st + k.7
(1) Et (1 + rt,k ) = Et [st (1 +rt,k*)/st + k].
In this equation, only the future exchange
rate is unknown, and Et  refers to the expecta-
tion based on knowledge available at time t. 
A second relation defines the risk premium
as the difference between the expected future
spot exchange rate and the current forward rate
that would settle on the same date as the future
spot rate. Thus, the difference between the 
actual future spot rate and the forward rate
equals the risk premium plus an error term
equaling the difference between the actual and
expected future spot rates (ut,k): 
(2) st, k – ft, k = rt, k + ut, k.
In (2), s and f refer to the logarithms of the
spot and forward rates.
Equation (1) is often rewritten as 
(3) st + k – st = rt, k* – rt, k + vt, k, 
where s and r are in logarithms, and v reflects
the difference between the actual and expected
future spot rate. UIP is usually tested by esti-
mating (4):
(4) st + k – st = a + br(rt, k* – rt, k) + vt, k.
The forward discount puzzle is that br, esti-
mated from (4), is usually negative instead of
being equal to +1, as implied by (3). The find-
ings regarding (4) are closely related to the
findings when the following version of equa-
tion (2) is estimated:8
(5) st + k – st = a + bf (ft, k – st) + ut, k.
As Engel (1996) carefully documents, econ-
ometric estimates of bf are often negative and
almost always significantly different from +1.
Recent research, however, has advanced in-
triguing possibilities for explaining the puzzle.9
For example, Baillie and Bollersev (1997) de-
monstrate that the apparently anomalous esti-
mates of bf might result from a combination of
persistent autocorrelation in the forward pre-
mium and the small size of the samples typically
studied. FR also provide evidence on the im-
portance of the sample when they estimate (4)
with pooled data for exchange rates within the
exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) of the Euro-
pean Monetary System. The estimate of br de-
clines when periods of realignment are ex-
cluded. This implies that the forward discount
puzzle might be explained partly by using sam-
ples in which realignments are anticipated more
n 6 A recent analysis of U.S. intervention in the 1990s (Humpage
[1997]) concludes that the authorities apparently had no information supe-
rior to that of the market. Such a finding is generally inconsistent with the
view that intervention signals new information about future monetary policy.
n 7 Here, “uncovered” refers to the fact that the risk posed by uncer-
tainty about the future exchange rate has not been eliminated (covered)
through use of a forward contract or other instrument. In covered interest
parity (CIP), the expected future exchange rate in (1) is replaced by the
forward rate. 
n 8 Addingft, k – st  to both sides of (2) yields (5) if the risk premium
equals 0, a = 0, and b = 1. Hence, rejecting a = 0 and b = 1 is often seen
as indicating the existence of a risk premium in the forward market. 
n 9 Another promising line of research utilizes term structure
models. See Bansal (1997).
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frequently than they occur. This phenomenon is
often referred to as the “peso problem.”
That monetary policy—or exchange-rate
policy—could help explain the anomaly is sug-
gested by the financial press’ interpretations of
short-term movements in exchange rates. News
of unanticipated economic strength is said to
bolster a currency’s value because interest rates
are expected to increase, implying the relevance
of expected monetary policy. Obviously, any
correlation between interest-rate and exchange-
rate movements would also be affected by
interventions that successfully prevent currency
appreciation.
At least three studies suggest that exchange-
rate policy might provide a partial explanation
of the anomaly. FR estimate (4) using floating-
rate data for several currencies’ quotes against
the dollar, and also using fixed-rate data for
currencies within the ERM, quoted against the
German mark. Their finding that estimates of
br became more positive for the fixed-rate
data suggests the importance of exchange-
rate regimes.
The analysis of (2) in Baillie and Osterberg
(1997) shows that central bank intervention
influenced risk in the forward market. This
points to the existence of a risk premium that
can be explained partly by central bank opera-
tions. Loopesko (1984) finds that central bank
intervention sometimes has explanatory power
for deviations from the UIP condition in equa-
tion (1).10  Taken together, these findings sug-
gest that intervention might be related to the
forward discount anomaly. For example, if
intervention is interpreted as an attempt to “fix”
or control exchange rates, then periods of
heavy intervention might be associated with
more positive estimates of br.
III. The Data 
and the Analytical
Framework
To see if the sign of the estimate of br varies
among periods of light versus heavy interven-
tion, I use the official daily intervention data
supplied by the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System and the Deutsche Bundes-
bank, in combination with 9:00 a.m. New York
quotes on DM/$ and Yen/$, as well as 3:00 p.m.
London 30-day Euromarket interest rates. Fig-
ures 1 and 2 depict movements in the logarithm
of exchange rates and in the difference in the
logarithms of interest rates. The intervention
series equal the net sales or purchases of U.S.
dollars vis-à-vis the foreign currency over the
24-hour period between consecutive business
day closings.
F I G U R E 1
Exchange-Rate Changes and 
Interest-Rate Differentials: DM/$
F I G U R E 2
Exchange-Rate Changes and
Interest-Rate Differentials: Yen/$
a. Calculated as log [s (t + k)] – log [s (t)].
b. Calculated as log [l + i*(t)] – log [l + i*(t)].
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
n 10 Other analyses of the impact of central bank intervention on UIP
are summarized by Edison (1993).
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The sample period extends from August 6,
1985 through September 6, 1991, a period that
includes two well-publicized Group of Three
(G-3) attempts to influence dollar exchange
rates.11 The Plaza Accord in September 1985
stipulated that the G-3 countries’ central banks
would intervene to bring down the level of the
dollar, and the Louvre Accord of February 1987
included statements that central banks would
strive to reduce fluctuations in the dollar. Other
periods of intervention were defined by ex-
amining the actual intervention time series.
These periods were characterized by relatively
heavy or consistent intervention by one or two
of the central banks.
We utilize a generalized-method-of-moments
(GMM) technique to account for the fact that
the error term appearing on the right side of (3)
has a high-order moving average representation
because the data are daily observations on a
T A B L E 1
Intervention and Uncovered 
Interest Parity: DM/$
Generalized-Method-of-Moments 
Estimates of Equation (4)
a (t-statistic) b (t: b = 0) Description
Sample criterion:
By intervention
9/23/85– –0.13  –3.4 Plaza Accord
11/12/85  (–3.6) (–3.1)
3/23/87– –0.18 –6.7 Louvre Accord
5/4/87 (–6.9) (–7.0)
8/4/87– –0.27 –9.2
9/9/87 (–8.8) (–9.5) *
10/20/87– –0.13 –3.2 After 10/87 crash
1/11/88 (–4.3) (–4.3)
6/9/88– –0.32 –10.0  *
9/27/88 (–5.5) (–6.1)
12/20/88– –0.25 –7.5  *
2/7/89 (–10.2) (–10.4) 
4/25/89– –0.41 –14.3 *
6/30/89 (–10.2) (–13.7)
8/11/89– –0.02 0.6 *
10/11/89 (–1.5)  (0.6)















5/15/90 (–3.0) (–1.8) 
Intervention Data (Number of observations)




11/12/85  35 19 8 0/27
3/23/87–
5/4/87 28 3 1 4/0
8/4/87–
9/9/87 26 6 4 5/5
10/20/87–
1/11/88 55 10 17 30/0
6/9/88–
9/27/88 76 28 29 0/57
12/20/88–
2/7/89 33 15 12 0/27
4/25/89–
6/30/89 45 10 16 0/25
8/11/89–
10/11/89 42 11 14 0/25




3/27/86 157 26 8 6/28 
4/21/86–
7/25/86 64 10 0 10/0
8/18/86–
12/31/87 90 8 0 7/1
1/26/87–
12/29/89 720 113 105 56/162
1/22/90–
5/16/90 79 2 2 0/2
8/6/85–
5/15/90 1,167 253 26 83/196
a. See Flood, Rose, and Mathieson (1991).
NOTE: Asterisks indicate periods of relatively heavy intervention. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
n 11 G-3 refers to the three largest industrialized countries—
Germany, Japan, and the United States.
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one-month interest-rate contract. I have matched
the future spot rate with the one-month Euro-
currency interest rate so that both settle on the
same day. As Baillie and Osterberg (1997) point
out, this implies an MA(21) representation. The
standard errors used to calculate the t-statistics
in the tables are also corrected for heteroscedas-
ticity. The instrumental variables chosen are a
constant, the lagged interest-rate differential,
and the lagged change in the logarithm of the
exchange rate. Hamilton (1994, chapter 10) pro-
vides a useful review of the issues involved in
GMM estimation. 
IV. Results
Table 1 presents the results of estimating equa-
tion (4) for the DM/$. For the entire sample
period, the estimate of b is slightly positive but
significantly less than one. The finding that the
coefficient is slightly positive is unusual, indi-
cating that the results may be sensitive to the
sample. However, for seven of the eight inter-
vention periods, the estimate of b is not only
significantly different from one but also signifi-
cantly negative.12  For comparison with FR, I
estimated equation (3) for the periods between
EMS realignments. Unlike FR, I find that the sign
of the estimated b does not seem to depend on
whether these periods are excluded from esti-
mation. However, the realignments and the
analysis in FR pertain to exchange rates of the
European currencies vis-à-vis the German mark.
Apparently, the ERM realignments were not re-
flected in the DM/$ or in the U.S. and German
interventions vis-à-vis the DM/$.
Table 2 presents similar results from estimat-
ing equation (4) for the Yen/$. The full-sample-
period estimate of b is negative and signifi-
cantly different from one. However, the results
for the subperiods provide less encouragement
that intervention could somehow explain the
forward discount puzzle: In only four of the 10
subperiods were the estimates of b significantly
negative. It is interesting that, in six of these
intervals, the estimate was significantly greater
than one.13  Overall, for the two currencies, 11
of the 18 subperiods showed estimates of br
that were significantly less than zero.
a (t-statistic) b(t: b = 0) Description
Sample criterion:
By intervention
9/23/85– –0.02  3.1  Plaza Accord
11/12/85  (–2.0) (4.9)
4/16/86– 0.09  5.8 *
8/7/86 (2.6) (2.6)
3/24/87– –0.3  –11.3 Louvre Accord
4/27/87 (–6.3) (–6.6)
8/13/87– 0.13  3.9 *
9/9/87 (2.9) (2.7)
10/27/87– 0.08 –2.3 After 10/87 crash
1/21/88 (–1.1) (–1.1)
3/15/88– –0.02  –0.9 *
4/20/88 (–2.9) (–3.4)
10/27/88– –0.08  –2.3 *
12/8/88 (–1.8) (–2.4)
4/28/89– 0.26  7.0 *
7/21/89 (4.1) (3.9)
8/7/89– 0.08 3.2 *
10/12/89 (4.5) (4.2)
2/23/90– 0.27 28.8 *
4/19/90 (5.4) (5.7)
8/6/85– –0.01  –0.2 Full sample
9/6/91 (–2.4) (–1.1)
Intervention Data (Number of observations)




11/12/85  34 0 20
4/16/86–
8/7/86 76 0 0
3/24/87–
4/27/87 23 16 0
8/13/87–
9/9/87 19 5 4
10/27/87–
1/21/88 57 22 0
3/15/88–
4/20/88 25 5 0
10/27/88–
12/8/88 28 13 0
4/28/89–
7/21/89 56 0 34
8/7/89–
10/12/89 47 0 28
2/23/90–
4/19/90 38 0 13
8/6/85–end 1,464  66 116
NOTE: Asterisks indicate periods of relatively heavy intervention. Numbers in
parentheses are t-statistics.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
T A B L E 2
Intervention and Uncovered 
Interest Parity: Yen/$
Generalized-Method-of-Moments 
Estimates of Equation (4)
n 12 These results appear to be robust to slight variations in the
length of the intervention periods.
n 13 On the other hand, when I estimate the same equation for the
full sample period, including intercept and slope dummies equal to one
for the intervention periods, both dummies differ significantly from zero.
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The second half of each table provides sum-
mary data on U.S. and/or German intervention.
In table 2, only official information about U.S.
intervention against the yen is available. Baillie
and Osterberg (1997) find evidence consistent
with the idea that U.S. buying—but not sell-
ing—of dollars affects risk in the forward mar-
ket. Here, I find that in the case of the DM/$, 
b is negative whether the intervention activity
was buying or selling. In the case of the Yen/$,
on the other hand, buying dollars is associated
with a negative estimate of b, while selling
implies a positive estimate.
V. Conclusion
My evidence on the importance of intervention
for the forward discount puzzle is strongest for
the DM/$. However, whereas FR find that b
became positive under fixed-rate regimes, I find
significantly negative estimates for intervention
periods. This suggests at least a need to clarify
the correspondence between my choice of in-
tervention periods and shifts between floating-
and fixed-rate regimes. However, the results
presented here are even more interesting when
one notes that estimated b was also negative
for both exchange rates following the Plaza and
Louvre agreements. Prior to each of these peri-
ods, public statements indicated the likelihood
of coordinated efforts to influence exchange
rates. Thus, we would have expected the results
in both instances to be similar to FR’s findings
for fixed-rate regimes.
The results also suggest that it would be
valuable to examine more closely the hypothe-
sis that buying currencies and selling them
have different impacts. It is certainly possible
that market conditions have varied between
periods of buying and periods of selling. Noise-
trading analyses, such as Hung (1997), discuss
the relevance of market thinness and the rules
followed by chartists.
Of course, recent research on the impor-
tance of sample size places rather stringent
qualifications on any conclusions I might draw.
Unfortunately, few central banks release high-
frequency data on intervention, although the
recent collapse of fixed-rate regimes and in-
creasing pressure for transparency on the part
of central banks might improve opportunities
to study the connection between exchange-rate
regimes, interest rates, and intervention.
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